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NOTES
THE SPECIFICITY OF PLEADING IN MODERN CIVIL
PRACTICE: ADDRESSING COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS*
The substantial rules of pleading are founded in strong sense, and in the
soundest and closest logic, and so appear, when well understood and
explained, though, by being misunderstood, and misapplied, they are often
made use of as instruments of chicane.1
-Lord Mansfield
I. INTRODUCTION
The pleading procedure serves as the foundation for the entire legal
process. Pleadings focus the issues, narrow the evidence admissible at
trial, apprise the adverse party and the court of the matter in dispute,
and provide the extent of the res judicata effect of the judgment.2 To
secure the foundation and to effectuate the purposes of the pleading pro-
cedure, it is imperative that the pleading set forth sufficient allegations.
The standard for determining the sufficiency of the allegations is referred
to as the specificity requirement and serves as the focus of this Note.
A common misconception in modern Virginia practice is that Virginia
is a "notice" pleading state.3 The Virginia pleading standard, however, is
* The authors wish to thank Professor W. Hamilton Bryson for his encouragement and
helpful insight.
1. B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 5 n.9 (1923) (quoting Robinson v. Raley, 1 Burr.
316).
2. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 949 (1987). "[T]here is a great deal
more in pleading than mere form. It stands ... as the bulwark of protection between the
bench and the litigant; it fixes inviolate limitation within which the judge may rule...
[and] it confines the testimony which may be introduced." Id. at 909 (quoting Shelton, Sim-
plification of Legal Procedure: Expediency Must Not Sacrifice Principle, 71 CENT. L.J. 330,
333, 337 (1910)); see also Blume, Theory of Pleading: A Survey Including the Federal
Rules, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 297, 297-318 (1949).
3. Compare VA. CT. R. 1:4(d) ("Every pleading shall state the facts on which the party
relies ... and it shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature
of the claim .... ") with FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief, ... shall contain... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
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clearly distinguishable from the "notice" standard of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure when viewed in light of its historical development and
judicial interpretation.4 A Virginia state court pleading is governed by
both the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia 5 and the Virginia De-
murrer Statute.6 What do the rules and demurrer statute require? The
answer to this question is more elusive than expected at first blush. The
requirement is not easily discernable from the modern cases.7 Moreover,
reference to older precedent can be misleading because the standard
enunciated in the older cases is a product of the specificity requirement
in force during the period in which the particular case was decided.8
Therefore, in order to understand the subtle guidance contained in the
modern cases, and to determine the proper impact of older cases, it is
essential to possess a thorough understanding of the evolution of the
specificity requirement in Virginia.9
To this end, an analytical framework consisting of two branches will be
utilized. The first branch concerns the need for allegations to establish a
right to remedial relief; this will be referred to as the cognizable substan-
tive branch. The second branch concerns the degree of factual precision
required in the allegations describing the actual dispute; this will be re-
ferred to as the factual precision branch.
pleader is entitled to relief. . .
The wording of the rules is similar and has led to the misconception that they are the
same. See Greer, Virginia and the Federal Rules, 47 VA. L. REv. 907, 909 (1961) ("[N]otice
pleading is part and parcel of the Virginia rules .... There could be no better description
of notice pleading [than Rule 1:4(d), formerly Rule 3:18(d)].").
4. See infra notes 187-228 and accompanying text.
5. VA. CT. R. 1:4(d); id. 1:4(j). Virginia Court Rule 1:4(d) provides: "Every pleading shall
state the facts on which the party relies in numbered paragraphs, and it shall be sufficient if
it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense." Virginia
Court Rule 1:4() as drafted by Judge Brockenbrough Lamb provides: "Brevity is enjoined
as the outstanding characteristic of good pleading. In any pleading a simple statement, in
numbered paragraphs, of the essential facts is sufficient."
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-273(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984). The section provides: "In any suit in
equity or action at law, the contention that a pleading does not state a cause of action or
that such pleading fails to state facts upon which the relief demanded can be granted may
be made by demurrer."
7. Unlike the older cases which explicitly address the specificity requirements, the mod-
em cases couch their analysis of the specificity requirement in terms of the substantive law.
As a consequence, modern lawyers and judges have the arduous task of disentangling the
specificity requirements implied in the courts' decisions. Compare Eaton v. Moore, 111 Va.
400, 69 S.E. 326 (1910) (quoting and analyzing the allegations contained in the pleading, and
stating the rationale for the determination of the sufficiency of the allegations) with Duggin
v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 360 S.E.2d 832 (1987) (court analyzing the substantive elements of
the cause of action and concluding that the pleading is sufficient, without setting forth the
rationale for the determination of the sufficiency).
8. See infra notes 62-177 and accompanying text.
9. "In order to understand the progress of the law the well educated lawyer must live
through its evolution." B. SHIPMAN, supra note 1, at 4 n.7.
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This Note is comprised of four sections. The first section presents a
description of the four general pleading theories. 10 The four general theo-
ries will be evaluated using the analytical framework. The conclusions of
this evaluation provide points of reference for determining the pleading
theory peculiar to Virginia practice. The second section presents the his-
torical development of the pleading rules in Virginia, evaluating their
evolution through the use of the analytical framework." The conclusions
of this analysis will be compared with the points of reference gained from
the general theories. Thus, the evolution of the Virginia pleading rules
will be traced and the changing pleading theories identified. The third
section analyzes the modern pleading rules in light of the basis created by
the historical development. Through this analysis, the specificity require-
ment currently in force in Virginia will be derived.12 The final section
provides guidelines for complying with Virginia's specificity
requirement.1
3
H. GENERAL THEORIES OF PLEADING: POINTS OF REFERENCE
There are four general theories of pleading; common law, equity, code
and notice.'4 Although the pleading theory in force in Virginia does not
fall clearly within any one of these general theories, 5 aspects of the gen-
eral theories form the foundation of the Virginia pleading theory. 6
A. Common Law Pleading
The touchstones of common law procedure were the rigid writ system"
10. See infra notes 14-61 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 62-177 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 178-226 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
14. See Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) (providing a test to distinguish
between the different theories and to classify the systems of the 50 states under the differ-
ent theories). See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 237-39
(1985).
15. See W. BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 187 (2d ed. 1989). "The
Virginia method of reform in the area of common law pleading was to keep the basic system
while removing a few totally archaic parts and improving on others." Id.; see also infra
notes 110-77 and accompanying text.
16. See W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 187-88.
17. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 52 (2d ed. 1979). The common
law pleading began with the original writ which stated the nature of the claim, in common
form, since the writs were drafted by the chancery, not the plaintiff's lawyer. Because the
writ was "ready-made", it shed little light on the true nature of the claim. As the writ sys-
tem evolved, the legal profession influenced changes in the language of the writ. However,
the court would scrutinize such writs and dismiss a writ if its contents "erred too much on
the side of originality." T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 408-09 (5th
ed. 1956).
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and the forms of action. 18 In order to obtain judicial relief, a party was
forced to select a single writ and meet the requirements of the form of
action contained in that writ.'9 All circumstances and human events, how-
ever, did not fit neatly into the prescribed forms of action. This dilemma
shaped the common law specificity rules.2 0
At common law a party was required to allege facts in the declaration
which established all of the elements of the particular form of action in
The following is an example of the form of an Original Writ in Debt:
George the Third, etc., to the Sheriff of -, Greeting: Command C.D., late of
- , that justly and without delay he render to A.B. the sum of £ - , of
good and lawful money of Great Britain, which he owes to and unjustly detains from
him, as it is said; and unless he shall do so, and if the said A.B. shall make you secure
of prosecuting his claim, then summon, by good summoners, the said C.D. that he be
before us, on __ wheresoever we shall be in England (or, in C.P. before our
Justices at Westminster, on .), to shew wherefore he hath not done it, and
have there the names of the summoners, and this writ. Witness ourself, etc. L.S.
B. SHIPMAN, supra note 1, at 18.
18. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 917 ("Lawyers had to analogize to the known writs and
use "fictions" because of the rigid forms of action."); see also Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986).
19. See W. BRYsON, supra note 15, at 190. The various forms of action included the
following:
The contract actions were: (1) debt which was used by the plaintiff to recover a
sum certain, (2) covenant, which was used to recover damages cause by a breach of a
sealed agreement, (3) assumpsit, which was used to recover damages from a breached
contract not under seal, and the recovery of money due the plaintiff and (4) account,
which was used to ascertain and recover an amount due to a bailiff or receiver of
goods or money.
The tort actions were: (1) trespass, which was used for the recovery of damages for
an injury committed by force, (2) trespass on the case, which lay for non-violent or
consequential injuries or an "incorporeal" right, (3) trover, which was used to recover
damages for the conversion of specific personal property, (4) detinue, which was used
for the recovery of a specific chattel wrongfully detained, (5) replevin, which was used
to recover specific personalty wrongfully taken together with damages for the deten-
tion and (6) ejectment, which was used to recover property held adversely.
C. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 45 (1928).
20. A plaintiff commenced a common law action by purchasing an original writ from the
chancery, the crown's secretariat. The original writ indirectly bestowed jurisdiction on the
Royal Court to hear the dispute. J. BAKER, supra note 17, at 49-50. In ancient practice, the
chancery clerk drafted a writ based upon the plaintiff's representation of the dispute. Once
judgment was given upon an action, the writ became precedent for like disputes. Id. at 51.
Thus, the writ contained a formula for judicial relief. Id. The formula was a set of elements
which were required to be proved in order to show a right to relief.
In ancient practice, it was believed that there were as many formulae as there were ac-
tions. Id. However, as the number of writs with precedential value increased, the invention
of new writs, with new formulae for relief, was viewed as changing the law. As a result, in
the Provisions of Oxford in 1258, the power of the chancery clerks to invent new writs was
revoked. This legislative action was an improper task for a bureaucrat. W. BRysON, supra
note 15, at 190. Since 1258, plaintiffs have been required to fit their disputes into one of the
existing prescribed writs and establish by proof the elements contained in its formula. J.
BAKER, supra note 17, at 51.
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order to satisfy the cognizable substantive branch.21 For example, in order
to show a right to remedial relief in an action for assumpsit, a party had
to allege facts establishing promise, consideration, breach and damage.22
A party satisfied the requirements of the factual precision branch by
pleading general allegations in the declaration without specifying the un-
derlying circumstances which gave rise to the dispute.2' This provided the
party with the necessary flexibility to fit his claim within a rigid form of
action. Consequently, as common law pleading practice developed, the
general allegations in the declaration became nothing more than formu-
lated terms of art set out to meet the requirements of a particular form of
action. For example, the plaintiff would allege that the defendant injured
him or his property with "swords, bows, and arrows" to establish the ele-
ment of "force and arms" in actions of trespass. 24 Although these expres-
sions had little to do with the underlying circumstances of the case,
pleading these terms of art became the standard practice to invoke the
judicial process. 25 Terms of art are indicative of the factual precision
branch of common law pleading.
The primary purpose of the common law pleading was to focus the is-
sues.26 The common law definition of the specificity requirement reflects
the court's emphasis on the statement of elements and its disinterest in
the particular allegations of the underlying circumstances of the dispute.
By requiring a statement of the elements, the court was able to identify
the issues involved with each element.
The common law procedure was greatly criticized because of its rigid-
ity. In addition, the general allegations which developed eventually un-
dermined the ability of the pleading to focus the issues because the
pleading became little more than a formality.27
21. See generally B. SHIPMAN, supra note 1, at 219.
22. See Winston's Ex'r v. Francisco, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 703, 703-04 (1796).
23. See Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 17, 21-22 (1988).
24. See E. JONES, MANUAL OF EQUrrY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 15 (1916) (Other examples
of the terms of art include: "owes to and unjustly detains" signifying an action in debt,
"converted to the defendant's use" signifying an action in trover.); Sutherland, Legal Rea-
soning in the Fourteenth Century: The Invention of "Color" in Pleading, ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL THORNE 190 (1981).
25. See Wolfson, supra note 23, at 22. "As the common law developed, the pleading be-
came more formalized and clear statements of fact gave way to vague and often fictitious
allegations couched in a sort of antiquated terminology." Id. at 22; see also J. FREIDENTHAL,
supra note 14, at 248.
26. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 916-17. This focus was necessary because of the common
law's use of the jury for most forms of action. See also W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 186
(simplifying the issues was considered better suited for decision making by the uneducated
layman in the jury); C. CLARK, supra note 19, at 10-12.
27. The procedures of the common law, however, varied with the form of action. The
trespass on the case action had greater flexibility. Although the procedures of the common
1990]
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B. Equity Pleading
In the fifteenth century, the Court of Chancery emerged to combat the
failures of the rigid common law system. 28 The equity courts filled the
gaps created by common law practice in order to provide a just result.2 9
This was reflected in the scope of the jurisdiction of the equity court.30
Filing a bill of complaint commenced a suit in equity. Unlike common
law, the party in equity was not required to comply with the rigid re-
quirements of a writ. Rather, the bill of complaint contained a factual
narrative and a request for relief.31
law have been criticized, the Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized the need to maintain
the substantive aspects of the common law. See, e.g., Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 7, 52
S.E.2d 135, 138 (1949).
28. See J. HOLCOMBE, BARTON'S HISTORY OF A SUIT IN EQUITY 25-38 (1847).
29. B. SHIPMAN, supra note 1, at 61. For example, "where substantial justice requires that
a contract be strictly and specifically performed, a court of equity has authority to compel
such performance, because a pecuniary recompense, which is all that a court at law can give,
would be an incomplete satisfaction." J. HOLCOMBE, supra note 28, at 35.
30. The scope of equity jurisdiction is based on the following criteria:
1. Where the principles of law by which the ordinary courts are guided give a right,
but the powers of those courts are not sufficient to afford a complete remedy, or their
modes of proceedings are inadequate to the purpose.
2. Where the courts of ordinary jurisdiction are made the instruments of injustice.
3. Where the principles of law, by which the ordinary courts are guided, give no right,
but upon the principles of universal justice the interference of the judicial power is
necessary to prevent a wrong, and the positive law is silent.
It may also be collected that courts of equity, without deciding upon the rights of
parties, administer to the ends of justice by assuming a jurisdiction.
4. To remove impediments to the fair decision of a question in other courts.
5. To provide for the safety of property in dispute pending a litigation, and to pre-
serve property in damager of being dissipated or destroyed by those to whose care it
is by law entrusted, or by person having immediate but partial interests.
6. To restrain the assertion of doubtful rights in a manner productive of irreparable
damage.
7. To prevent injury to a third person by the doubtful title of others.
8. To put a bound to vexatious and oppressive litigation, and to prevent the multi-
plicity of suits.
Further, courts of equity, without pronouncing any judgment which may affect the
rights of parties, extend their jurisdiction:
9. To compel a discovery or obtain evidence which may assist the 'decision of other
courts.
10. To preserve testimony when in danger of being lost before the matter to which it
relates can be the subject of judicial investigation.
J. HOLCOMBE, supra note 28, at 34 n.1 (quoting Lord Redesdale in his treatise on pleading).
31. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 918. Instead of focusing on a single issue, the bill in
equity was an attempt to persuade the chancellor by telling the story behind the dispute.
Id.; see also E. JoNEs, supra note 24, at 15 (In contrast to common law pleading, "[t]he
employment of particular words, or fixed forms of expression was never a requisite of good
pleading in equity, and an adherence to the formal precedents, though often wise, is not
essential.").
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In equity, the cognizable substantive branch required a statement of
the "essential facts" to establish a right to remedial relief.2 Originally,
the essential facts were required only to show a wrong, thereby establish-
ing a right to relief. However, as the substantive equity doctrines evolved,
equity became bound by precedent. Allegations of the "elements" con-
tained in prior precedent were required to be pleaded to show a right to
the particular remedy.3 Thus, similar to common law, a party was re-
quired to allege facts establishing the elements of the equitable remedy to
show a right to remedial relief.
The factual precision branch required a statement of the specific un-
derlying facts of the dispute, rather than the fixed forms of expression
required at common law.3 4 The plaintiff had two incentives for stating
specific facts. First, properly setting forth facts broadened the plaintiff's
chances for obtaining the relief sought because the chancellor shaped the
remedy according to the allegations in the bill. Second, the plaintiff was
entitled to the "right of discovery." 35 The "right of discovery" compelled
the defendant to answer under oath all of the material- allegations pro-
pounded in the plaintiff's bill. The defendant was not only required to
admit or deny the allegations, but also was compelled to disclose all facts
deemed relevant to the suit.3
The primary purpose of equity pleading emphasized setting forth the
particular facts depicting the circumstances of the case. Therefore, a body
of rules requiring the parties to state the facts with particularity devel-
oped."' By requiring such a statement of specific facts, the specificity
rules of equity accomplished the purposes of the pleading process.
C. Code Pleading
Dissatisfaction with the common law system set the stage for law re-
form in the early nineteenth century. To this end, David Dudley Field, in
1848, propounded a code of practice for New York. The "Field Code"
merged the common law and equity courts into one system and abolished
the technical common law writ system. An action was initiated by filing a
32. For cases interpreting the "essential facts" requirement, see infra notes 103-09 and
accompanying text.
33. See W. FLETCHER, EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 104 (1902).
34. See E. JoNEs, supra note 24, at 15; Subrin, supra note 2, at 920 ("[E]quity was more
flexible, discretionary, and individualized.").
35. See E. JoNEs, supra note 24, at 17-18. For a discussion of the discovery processes
under common law and equity, see Wolfson, supra note 23, at 21-25.
36. E. JoNEs, supra note 24, at 18-19. The defendant "must answer each and every allega-
tion of the bill, and give all the discovery called for by the bill." Id. at 18 (emphasis omit-
ted). The disclosure of facts included the production of deeds, writings, or any other infor-
mation which tended to prove the plaintiff's case. Id. at 19.
37. W. FLETCHER, supra note 33, at 103-05.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
complaint, which had the same requirements for every substantive form
of action."
The requirement of "a plain and concise statement of the facts consti-
tuting a cause of action without replication" codified the specificity re-
quirement. 9 Contained in this language are the two branches of the ana-
lytical framework. The requirement of stating a cause of action
encompasses the cognizable substantive branch, and the requirement of
stating the facts which formed the basis of the action encompasses the
factual precision branch.
As the concepts of the "Field Code" spread to other jurisdictions, the
exact determination of what constituted a "cause of action" and what
constituted a "fact" differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.40 The de-
bate over the proper definition of a cause of action narrowed to two pri-
mary views.4 ' The first view, advocated by Professor McCaskill4 2 stated
that the cause of action refers to a group of facts that establish the
party's entitlement to specific relief.43 The well established and logical
distinctions of the substantive common law remained the determining
factor for whether the facts established a right to relief. Under this view,
a party was required to plead the facts that established the substantive
elements of the cause of action.44
Professor Clark, the driving force behind the federal pleading rules, ad-
vocated the second view. Clark asserted that a cause of action was merely
a group a facts which would entitle the party to relief in the eyes of a
layman, without reference to the substantive requirements of the com-
mon law.4" Clark's view was based on his belief that the primary purpose
of the pleading was to provide notice of the claim to the opposite party.
Clark maintained that the requirement of setting forth the elements in
the pleading unwisely focused the judge's attention on procedures, rather
than on substantive matters.46
Jurisdictions adopted the cause of action view that manifested their
concept of the primary purpose of the pleading. Some jurisdictions moved
along the continuum toward a notice standard. Others held steadfast to a
38. See C. CLARK, supra note 19, at 17-19.
39. 1851 N.Y. LAws, c. 479, § 1.
40. See generally Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L.
REv. 416 (1921); Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 16 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1932); Morris, Law and
Fact, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1303 (1942); Wheaton, The Code "Cause of Action:" Its Definition,
22 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1936).
41. See C. CLARK, supra note 19, at 77-87.
42. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614 (1925).
43. Id.
44. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 995. "The idea of a cause of action helps lawyers and
judges to decide what is relevant." Form is needed to shape the substance. Id.
45. C. CLARK, supra note 19, at 83-87.
46. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 963.
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statement of facts standard, with the tried and true common law substan-
tive concepts providing the necessary structure to focus the issues.
47
The degree of factual precision was taken from equity practice.48 The
underlying facts and circumstances were required to be pleaded, thus,
rectifying pleading problems wrought by the general allegations of com-
mon law practice. However, the factual precision branch of code pleading
required the plaintiff to plead ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts
or conclusions of law; the difference between these concepts is a matter of
degree.49
The primary purpose of code pleading was to obtain a statement of the
underlying facts in order to provide structure for the expandable single
form of action. The Field Code was criticized because of the differing in-
terpretations of its pleading requirements."
D. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The growing criticism with the problems inherent in code pleading re-
sulted in a major change in pleading theory; the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure embodied this change. Federal Rule 8(a)(2) requires a party to
set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."5'
The federal rules adopted Clark's concept of a cause of action.52 There-
fore, under the cognizable substantive branch, in federal practice a party
is required merely to apprise the opposing party of the general nature of
the claim, without regard to the substantive elements of the particular
cause of action.53
47. For a discussion of the concept of a cause of action in Virginia, see infra notes 187-210
and accompanying text.
48. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 933-34.
49. See id. at 966. "Clark was impressed with the observation that one could not define
what was a fact, evidence, or ultimate fact in a scientific way, and that such terms were best
seen as a continuum, without logical cut-off points." Id. For a discussion of these concepts,
see infra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
50. See J. FREDENTHAL, supra note 14, at 248-51.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
52. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
53. J. FREMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 254 (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976)). Some commentators prefer to characterize the federal rules as
'"modern pleading" rather than "notice pleading." Clark, Pleading Under the Federal
Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177, 181 (1958).
The fear is that "notice" will be taken to mean that no more is required than mere
statement that a suit has been filed and damages are desired; whereas, in fact, the
pleader must refer to the circumstances and events upon which the claim or defense
is based. What the pleader need not do is worry about the particular form of the
statement or that it fails to allege a specific fact to cover every element of the sub-
stantive law involved.
1990]
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The factual precision branch requirements under the federal rules are
equally liberal. The federal rules abandoned the distinction between ulti-
mate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law.5 ' A pleading under
the federal rules is merely a method of initiating a proceeding and pro-
vides little practical importance in focusing the issues or apprising a party
of a specific claim.
55
The advent of notice pleading was hailed as a major improvement over
the code system.5" In recent years, however, notice pleading has shown
signs of tarnish on the shield set up by its advocates. Federal courts are
requiring greater specificity.5 Federal Rule 11 now requires the pleading
to be "well grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law. .. .
Rule 11 and the trend toward requiring more specificity show a move-
ment back to McCaskill's concept of a cause of action 59 and its underlying
emphasis on the statement of fact.60 This movement is a result of the
inadequacy of notice pleading to accomplish the purposes of pleading.61
J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 14, at 253-54 (1985).
54. 2A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.13, at 8-60 (1990).
55. Id. at 1 8.02, at 8-9.
56. "First, the rule eliminates the seemly endless controversies concerning what consti-
tutes a 'cause of action' and what is a 'fact' as opposed to mere evidence or a conclusion of
law." J. FREIDENTHAL, supra note 17, at 253. "The issue becomes whether the opposing party
has been sufficiently notified concerning the claim (or defense) so as to be able to prepare to
meet it." Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d
774 (2d Cir. 1944)).
Second, the rule avoids the traumatic problems of the theory of the pleadings doc-
trine. The doctrine clearly has no place in the federal scheme, which abolishes the
requirement that a "cause of action" be stated. As the federal cases consistently hold,
a party is permitted to recover whenever she has a valid claim, even though her attor-
ney fails to perceive the proper basis of the claim at the pleading stage.
J. FREIDENTHAL, supra note 14, at 253.
57. Marcus, supra note 18, at 444-51.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
59. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
60. See Weltner, On With the Old!, 24 GA. ST. BAR 13 (1987). Justice Charles Longstreet
Weltner of the Supreme Court of Georgia discusses the inadequacy of the federal rules no-
tice pleading and the "discovery abuse" that has emerged in recent years. Justice Weltner
describes the effects of notice pleading as follows:
Anxiously [the defendant] scans the complaint. ("What have I done-what did I
do-to so injure and damage another?") The answer: conclusions, hyperbole, assever-
ation, contention -words signifying nothing! ("But what did I do!"-he asks.)
No answer.
A plaintiff may demand a million dollars with no hint of the basis for that demand.
That is untidy and unseemly-that a defendant must spend his time and money
prying from the plaintiff the factual elements of the claim against him! That is just
the opposite from the proper order of things. No one should be permitted to invoke
the costly (to the public and opposite party alike) machinery of the law without hav-
ing to say what happened. Otherwise, the taxpayers are subsidizing an instrument for
oppression, where any spite-filled person may select a victim who, under pain of de-
fault, must find out where he is supposed to have erred, while the claimant may cloak
his ultimate factual designs in vague charges and conclusions. Such a perversity
hardly merits the name of Justice.
Id. at 20.
61. When notice pleading dumps into the lap of a court an erroneous controversy without
the slightest guide to what the court is asked to decide; when discovery-totally un-
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III. EVOLUTION OF PLEADING IN VIRGINIA
Having gained an understanding of the general pleading theories, we
now turn to the unique development of the specificity requirement in Vir-
ginia. The following historical perspective serves two purposes. First, it
provides an understanding of the intended specificity standard contained
in the Virginia rules and demurrer statute. Second, it demonstrates the
impact of the older precedent on the modern standard.
In 1607 the settlers of Virginia brought with them the legal system
which was in force in England-the system of common law and equity.
6 2
The common law and equity jurisdictions have been administered in a
fused court system since the colonial period.6 3 When Virginia adopted the
English system, it also inherited the pleading system that was in force,
including the revisions set in place by English statutes.64 At the time of
limited because no issue is framed-mulls over millions of papers, translates them to
microfilm and feeds them into computers to find out if they can be shuffled into any
relevance . . . we should, I think, consider whether noble experiments have gone
awry.
Subrin, supra note 2, at 912 n.15 (quoting Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good
Intentions Gone Awry?, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE Fu-
TURE (A. Levin & R. Wheeler Eds. 1979)).
Given the ease of pleading, the aggressive and creative lawyers being paid by the hour will
utilize the rules as an "unbounded procedural playground." Id. at 980. The federal proce-
dure "no longer provides the definition, confinement, and focus that aid in law application
and rights vindication." Id. at 988. Settlements are based on anticipated trial results and
therefore the pleading must confine the focus in order to make a prediction on the result. As
there is no focus, the pleading does not aid in settlement. Id. at 989. "It seems clear that the
pleading rules themselves without the aid of supplementary procedures, do not attain the
objectives of clearing the ground and defining the issues." Fee, The Lost Horizon in Plead-
ing Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 492 (1948).
62. W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 33-34, 62-63. The common law filled the gap in the
colonies because there was no pre-existing system of law. In the charter given to the James-
town Colony there was a requirement that disputes be settled in accordance with common
law and equity. Id. at 34-35.
63. Id. at 67.
64. The sixteenth century statute of Jeofails was among the English statutes adopted by
Virginia. VA. CODE. ANN. ch. 28 (1789). The statute of Jeofails provided that defects of form
would not be grounds for dismissal unless specifically alleged in the demurrer. The statute
of Jeofails adopted by Virginia was based upon the version of the statute of Jeofails con-
tained in the Statute of Anne. Cathrae v. Clarke, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 107, 110 (1834). The
language of the statute of Jeofails was altered when it was adopted by the Virginia legisla-
ture. Compare 27 ELIZ. ch. 5 with VA. CODE. ANN. ch. 76, § 27 (1792). The Virginia version of
the statute differs in two respects. Cathrae, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) at 110-11. First, the Virginia
statute applies to defects of both form and substance whereas the English version only ap-
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independence, statutes reaffirmed the use of the system of common law
and equity. 5 The common law and equity system, although modified in
some respects, continues in force today.6
A. Pleading Theory in Early Virginia Common Law Practice
1. Forms of Actions as a Basis of Pleading Theory
Although the Original Writ was not required,6" the forms of action re-
mained the driving force behind early Virginia practice.6 ' The procedures
in prosecuting the actions and the respective pleading rules differed be-
tween the forms of action. Therefore, in order to properly analyze the
early Virginia pleading rules, an understanding of the different forms of
action is required.7 0
There were two categories of actions at common law. First, there were
praecipe actions which vindicated rights of the plaintiff. 1 The praecipe
writ commanded the defendant to either do right or come before the
court and explain why he had not acted.7 2 The praecipe actions focused
on restoration of the right rather than compensation for the misconduct.73
A number of species of praecipe writs emerged in the register of writs,
including the writ of right to lands, the writ of debt, the writ of detinue,
and the writ of covenant.74 As the praecipe writs were the oldest actions,
plied to defects of form. Id. at 111. The purpose of covering defects of substance as well as
form was to combat the practice of English judges who interpreted defects of substance in
order to bypass the statute. Second, the Virginia statute provided that if the declaration
omitted "something so essential to the action . . . as that judgment according to the law
... cannot be given" the court may regard such a defect even though it is not specifically
set forth in the demurrer. Id. This language was a manifestation of the legislature's intent to
define the required substance of the declaration as allegations which are essential to the
right of recovery. See Dickinson's Adm'r v. M'Craw, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 76, 77 (1826).
65. Id. at 33 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10; 1 PA. BRUCE, INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF Vm-
GINiA 463-77 (1910)).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
67. The jurisdictions of the courts in Virginia are prescribed by statute. Thus, in early
Virginia practice an Original Writ was not required. See M. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§ 138 (4th ed. 1952). A common law action was commenced by filing a memorandum with
the clerk of the court. 2 HENING'S STATUTES, 71, Act 32. The memorandum informed the
clerk as to the form of action requested. See M. BURKS, supra, at § 139. The clerk would
then issue a summons and the plaintiff would file a declaration. See id. at § 138.
68. See generally W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 185-89.
69. The various forms represented individual theories of liability, procedure, and specific-
ity requirements. See generally M. BURKS, supra note 67.
70. Earlier, this Note discussed the forms of action in general terms for the purpose of
providing a general background. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
71. J. BAKER, supra note 17, at 55.
72. Id. at 54.
73. Id. at 55.
74. Id.
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the procedures that accompanied them were archaic.-5 The complexity of
these procedures led to decreased use of the praecipe writs.
The second category was trespass actions which vindicated wrongs suf-
fered by the plaintiff. The trespass writ did not offer the option of doing
right, but instead summoned the defendant to show why he had done the
alleged wrong.76 The royal court initially limited the scope of trespass ac-
tions to trespass involving a breach of the peace, known as trespass vi et
armis.7 Species of trespass vi et armis included trespass to land by
breaking a close, taking and carrying away goods, and assault and battery.
The limited scope of the trespass vi et armis left many wrongs without
judicial remedy. The writ of trespass on the case filled the gap.7 8 Trespass
on the case applied to all non-forcible wrongs. The scope of trespass on
the case was expandable to accommodate society's changing needs. The
subspecies of trespass on the case included assumpsit, trover, and eject-
ment. Subsequently, trespass on the case became the primary action be-
cause of its flexibility and the problems of procedure and proof associated
with the rigid praecipe actions. 9
The pleading rules under the praecipe writs and the trespass vi et
armis writs exemplified the traditional common law pleading rules.8 0 A
75. The writ of right was originally tried by battle. A writ in debt and a writ of covenant
were tried by wager of law. Id. at 56.
76. Id.
77. The limitation of the trespass vi et armis was primarily a jurisdictional matter. The
clerks issued the writs for trespasses which breached the king's peace, for wrongs done in
opposition to royal franchise, or for deceits of the king's court. Other wrongs were consid-
ered general, not suitable for royal justice, and were restricted to the county courts. The
wrongs in the county courts were further restricted to matters over 40 shillings or to matters
in which the claim was true, as in a case of assault and battery. Other limitations existed
which increased the desire for additional avenues of remedy. Consequently new writs began
to be issued which required the plaintiff to plead his cause of action with more particularity.
These writs were called writs of trespass for "special case." These writs grew into a wider
family of writs more commonly know as trespass on the case. Id. at 57.
78. See id. at 58; see also PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 6, at 29 (1984).
Trespass was the remedy for all forcible, direct and immediate injuries, whether to
person or to property-or in other words, for the kind of conduct .likely to lead to a
breach of the peace by provoking immediate retaliation. Trespass on the case...
developed. . . to afford a remedy for obviously wrongful conduct resulting in injuries
which were not forcible or not direct. . . . The classic illustration of the difference
between trespass and case is that of a log thrown into the highway. A person struck
by the log as it fell could maintain a trespass against the thrower, since the injury was
direct; but one who was hurt by stumbling over it as it lay in the road could maintain,
not trespass, but an action on the case.
Id.
79. The forms of action survived so long because the changing needs of society were sup-
plied by the action of trespass on the case which was an expandable general form of action.
W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 190-91.
80. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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party was required to state the elements in general terms of art to meet
the requirements of the restrictive forms. In contrast, trespass on the case
actions required the plaintiff to set forth the specifics of the underlying
factual dispute. The specific facts were required because of the expand-
able nature of the action.
2. Cognizable Substantive Branch in Early Virginia Pleading
Early Virginia pleading exemplified the traditional common law con-
cept of the cognizable substantive branch. The courts required the plead-
ing to aver all of the substantive elements of the particular cause of ac-
tion."' In Laughlin v. Flood,8 2 the court held that the declaration in an
action of covenant was defective."3 To establish a cause of action of cove-
nant a plaintiff must plead three elements: 1) the existence of a covenant;
2) breach; and 3) damage. 4 In Laughlin, the plaintiff entered into a cove-
nant which provided that, in exchange for services rendered, the defend-
ant promised to pay one-twelfth of the grain grown on his plantation at
the close of the year. 5 Although the plaintiff averred in the declaration
that the defendant did not pay him one-twelfth of the grain, the plaintiff
failed to allege that any grain was grown during that year. 6 Accordingly,
the declaration was held defective for failing to establish the element of
breach.8
Judge Spencer Roane discussed the definition of the term "cause of
action."8 8 Judge Roane reasoned that the covenant merely laid the foun-
dation for a cause of action and that a cause of action existed only upon
establishing a breach with resulting damage.8 9 Thus, the cause of action is
defined as a set of facts which establish the right to recovery under the
substantive law. This concept that the substantive law provides the basic
skeleton for shaping the pleading is the crux of traditional common law
pleading.90
Averments establishing each element of a cause of action was required
under all forms of action. This requirement not only existed under the
praecipe writ as illustrated by Laughlin, but it also existed under trespass
81. See Laughlin v. Flood, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 255 (1811); Winston's Ex'r v. Francisco, 2 Va.
(2 Wash.) 703 (1796).
82. Laughlin, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) at 255.
83. Id. at 274.
84. M. BURKS, supra note 67, § 80, at 167-68.
85. Laughlin, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) at 260.
86. Id. at 261-62.
87. Id. at 274.
88. Id. at 261-62.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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on the case actions."1 In Winston's Executor v. Francisco,2 the plaintiff
brought an action for trespass on the case in assumpsit.9 3 The court held
that the declaration was defective because the plaintiff failed to aver
promise, which is an element of assumpsit9 4 In early Virginia practice,
therefore, the cognizable substantive branch was exemplified by the tradi-
tional common law requirement of alleging a cause of action by stating
the elements of the substantive law which establishes the parties' right to
judicial relief.
3. Factual Precision Branch in Early Virginia Pleading
The court addressed the factual precision branch in Turberville v.
Long." ' In Turberville, the plaintiff brought an action under a praecipe
writ of quod reddat to recover his real property.96 The allegations con-
cerning the boundaries of the land were in dispute. The plaintiff, in
describing the boundaries, alleged that they were lines established by a
survey. The court stated that the plaintiff need only state the terms of art
for boundaries in this action; the description given as "the lands of A. B.
C. and D. or by such a river, or such a creek, or water-course, and the
lands of A. B. C." was held to be sufficient.91 In praecipe actions, the
general terms of art of traditional common law pleading typified the re-
quired factual precision. 8
The requirements of the factual precision branch in trespass on the
case, however, differed from that of the praecipe writs. In Jones v. Old
Dominion Cotton Mills, 9 the court outlined the factual precision require-
ments of an allegation in a trespass on the case action. The court held
that the declaration in this negligence case was sufficient because it stated
with detail the injury, improper conduct, and the care and maintenance
of the machinery.10 0 Therefore, the factual precision branch in trespass on
the case required a detailed statement of the underlying facts which gave
91. See Winston's Ex'r v. Francisco, 2 Va. (2 Wash. 187) 703 (1796).
92. Id. at 703.
93. For assumpsit, which was directed at recovery of damages for breach of contract, the
essential elements were promise, consideration, breach, and damage. See M. BURKS, supra
note 67, § 94, at 196.
94. Winston's Ex'r, 2 Va. (2 Wash. 188) at 704.
95. 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 674 (1809) (writ of right to recover lands).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 674. Although the court allowed the use of general terms of art, that did not
rigidly require a specific set of general terms of art, as did the early common law courts in
England. Rather, they allowed other general terms of art which had the same import. See
Mairs v. Galluhue, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 94 (1852). The court stated that the general term
"owned the banks" had the same import as "had the fee simple property in the land on
both sides of the stream." Id. at 96-97.
98. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
99. 82 Va. 140 (1886).
100. Id. at 148.
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rise to the dispute, unlike the general averments under the praecipe
writs.1"1 This rule demonstrates the factual precision branch concept
enunciated under the code pleading theory. The similarity to the code
pleading theory is a result of the expandable scope of the trespass on the
case action. 102
B. Pleading Theory in Early Virginia Equity Pleading
The general substantive and procedural principles that had evolved in
England were adopted in colonial Virginia.10 3 Virginia adopted the pri-
mary rule of equity pleading requiring the complainant to state in the bill
of complaint the essential facts which would entitle him to the relief
sought.1
0 4
The requirement of a statement of essential facts satisfies both the cog-
nizable substantive branch and the factual precision branch. The require-
ments of the cognizable substantive branch are illustrated in Saunders v.
Baltimore Building & Loan Association.'0 5 In Saunders, the complainant
sought to enjoin the defendant from selling the complainant's real estate,
which secured a debt owed to the defendant."' For an injunction, a party
must show that damage is imminent.'07 The complainant failed to aver
damage in the bill.108 Therefore, the complaint was defective because it
failed to state the essential facts showing a substantive right to the relief
sought.
Like common law, the substantive principles of equity provide the ba-
sic skeleton for shaping the pleading. The requirements of the factual
precision branch were the traditional requirements of equity practice.
The underlying circumstances of the dispute were required to be pleaded.
Statements of fact rather than conclusions of law or evidence were
necessary. 10 9
C. Reform of Virginia Common Law Pleading 1849-1949
During the end of the nineteenth century and the early part of the
twentieth century, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the common
101. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
102. The code theory had but one form of action, and thus, the specific factual circum-
stances were required to be pleaded. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
103. See W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 62-63.
104. Saunders v. Baltimore Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 99 Va. 140, 145, 37 S.E. 775, 777 (1901).
105. Id. at 140, 37 S.E. at 775.
106. Id. at 141-42, 37 S.E. at 776.
107. Id. at 144, 37 S.E. at 777.
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
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law system in Virginia, which was perceived to be archaic. 1 0 The fever of
law reform flourished at this time as jurisdictions across the country wres-
tled with the decision of whether to follow the Field Code" and later the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 2 Although the adoption of a new sys-
tem of procedure was a topic of great debate,"'3 Virginia avoided a precip-
itous rejection of past procedures. Instead, Virginia, mindful of the tested
procedures of the past, modified the existing system to adapt it to the
needs of the time. This adaptation was performed by legislative action,
expanded use of trespass on the case, and increased availability of the
motion for judgment.
1. Statutory Reforms
The traditional common law system, including its pleading rules, was
modified by the legislature in three ways. First, the legislature changed a
number of the rigid common law pleading rules which were "traps for the
unwary."" 4 The legislature abolished several formal rules requiring the
allegation of technical details such as averring jurisdiction, 15 pleading the
place of the contract,"' and alleging the place of a tortious act.17 In addi-
tion, the legislature provided for amendments to the pleadings, which
would be granted in furtherance of justice.""
Second, the legislature tempered the problems of the general allega-
tions of common law pleading by requiring specific allegations in a num-
ber of actions. For example, in a declaration for ejectment, the premises
110. See Allen, Some Defects in Virginia Practice and Procedure, 32 VA. L. REv. 429
(1946); Patteson, Law Reform-A Rejoinder, 14 VA. L.J. 65 (1890); Patteson, Law Reform,
13 VA. L.J. 677, 679 (1889); W.B., Suggested Changes In Civil Procedure in Virginia, 11 VA.
L.J. 69 (1887). Cf. Shelton, The Reform of Judicial Procedure; Necessity for an Equable
Division of Power Between the Legislature and Judicial Departments, 1 VA. L. REv. 89
(1913) (stressing the need for Virginia courts to undergo reform).
111. For a discussion of the Field Code, see supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
See also Note, In the Hope of a New Birth of the One Form of Action, 13 VA. L. REV. 69
(1926) (making a plea for Virginia to abandon the forms of action in pleadings).
112. For a discussion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra notes 51-61 and
accompanying text. See also Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 435 (1958) (surveying the first twenty years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
113. See W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 198; see also Phelps, The Notice of Motion and
Modern Procedural Reform, 35 VA. L. REv. 380, 391 (1949) (stating that "a great deal of
discussion [is] going on in Virginia as to the advisability of adopting the federal rules of
procedure as the rules of procedure for the state courts.").
114. W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 199.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 3244 (1887). This statute changed Thornton v. Smith, 1 Va. (1
Wash.) 420 (1792) which held that a declaration was insufficient because it failed to state
the terms "within the jurisdiction of the court." Id. at 421.
116. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3243 (1887).
117. Id. at § 3247.
118. 1914 V& AcTs ch. 331.
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were required to be described with certainty.1 ' Also, the legislature cre-
ated a provision for the bill of particulars. 120 The bill of particulars was
created to give notice of the nature of the claims, and therefore, tempered
the general allegations permitted under early common law pleading.
12
'
Third, the legislature rectified many problems of the rigid common law
forms of action. Most importantly, it made trespass on the case available
for any action which sounded in trespass. 2 2 Also, whenever an action of
covenant would lie, the plaintiff could sue in assumpsit.' 21 These statutes
had a profound effect on the specificity required in Virginia because they
precipitated the increased use of the trespass on the case action.
2. The Rise of Trespass on the Case
As trespass on the case became the primary form of action in the late
nineteenth century, the greater degree of specificity required under tres-
pass on the case affected Virginia practice. Because the specific underly-
ing facts of the dispute were required to be pleaded in trespass on the
case actions, the court had to provide guidance for the necessary degree
of precision in the statement of the underlying facts.
Two competing interests were involved in determining the necessary
degree of precision. First, there was a need to ensure that a statement of
sufficient underlying facts provided structure to the expandable scope of
the trespass on the case action. Second, there was a need to limit the
underlying facts in order to prevent the pleading from becoming convo-
luted and thereby confusing the true issues. Therefore, the Virginia Su-
preme Court created a body of rules, similar to those that had evolved in
equity.'2 These rules provided guidance for the required precision, and in
so doing, balanced the competing pleading needs.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 5458 (1919).
120. Id. § 3249 (1887).
121. W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 211. The purpose of the bill was to reduce surprise at
the trial by providing additional information which apprised the opposite party of the true
nature of the claim. The bill further presented the issues and limited the evidence ad-
missable at trial. Id. at 211-12; see also Phelps, The Bill of Particulars in Virginia, 39 VA. L.
REv. 989 (1953).
122. VA. CODE ANN., ch. 148, § 7 (1849); see also Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119
Va. 271, 279, 89 S.E. 305, 307 (1916) (stating that the declaration did not have to state the
plea in trespass or trespass on the case because it was sufficient to allow the court to pro-
ceed on the merits).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 6088 (1919).
124. For a discussion of the equity rules, see supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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a. Statement of Facts Rather Than Conclusions of Law and Statement
of Ultimate Facts Rather Than Evidentiary Facts: Parameters for Deter-
mining Required Factual Precision
The court defined the factual precision branch in trespass on the case
actions by using two rules which created parameters for the allegations.
The first parameter was that the allegations must be statements of fact
rather than conclusions of law.125 This rule ensured that the allegations
provided the necessary structure for defining the issues under the ex-
pandable trespass on the case action. The second parameter was that the
allegation must be a statement of ultimate fact rather than evidentiary
fact.12 This rule ensured clarity by limiting the amount of detail which
would otherwise confuse the substantive issues. The factual allegations
met the required factual precision if they fell within the parameters of
these rules. 2
7
The first parameter, a statement of fact rather than a conclusion of law,
was addressed by Judge Burks in E.L Du Pont De NeMours & Co. v.
Snead's Administrator.12 1 Judge Burks gave the following example:
[T]he substantive law says if A assaults B, he shall respond in damages to
B, and B comes in and by his declaration says A assaulted me. The neces-
sary conclusion from these premises, if not controverted, is a judgement
[sic] in favor of B against A for damages. It is wholly unnecessary for B to
say anything about the law of the case, or what were the respective rights
and duties of the parties in the premises. This is a matter of law of which
the court takes judicial notice .... What must be stated is the facts out of
which the legal duty arises.12
125. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Snead's Adm'r, 124 Va. 177, 184, 97 S.E.
812, 813 (1919).
126. See, e.g., Norfolk & Portsmouth Beltline R.R. v. Sturgis, 117 Va. 532, 85 S.E. 572
(1915).
127. The ultimate or operative facts are those facts which will allow the plaintiff to win
his case. B. SHIPMAN, supra note 1, at 493. The failure of ultimate facts destroys the legal
result intended by the plaintiff. Id. at 492. The ultimate facts must be "facts, definite and
concrete enough to direct attention to the basis and ground of his legal contentions. But at
the same time they must reduce the case to its essentials." Id. at 493. For example, if the
plaintiff wants to show that he is the owner of land, he should not set forth the links in his
chain of title, as this would be evidentiary. However, stating that the defendant signed and
delivered a contract in writing is a statement of operative facts in executing the contract. Id.
The ultimate facts do not include the details and particulars of evidence on which the ulti-
mate facts are to be established. Id. at 492. The evidentiary facts are subordinate to the
ultimate facts and may be brought forward for the first time at trial. Id. at 493. Denial of
evidentiary facts on the record is usually an immaterial issue, not decisive of the question in
dispute. Id. at 494. An assertion which merely states legal conclusions is insufficient. Id.
Statements describing conduct as negligent or wrongful or statements describing the exis-
tence of a legal duty are mere conclusions. Id. at 495.
128. Du Pont, 124 Va. 177, 97 S.E. 812.
129. Id. at 183-84, 97 S.E. at 813.
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As Judge Burks indicated, the distinction between a conclusion of law
and statement of fact can best be illustrated by considering the proper
function of the pleading and the court. The function of the court is to
take notice of the law, and the function of the pleading is to state facts."'
The court must determine whether the facts, if proved, would establish a
right to relief under the substantive law. The pleading gives the court the
necessary tool to make this decision. If the pleading alleges conclusions of
law rather than statements of fact, the pleading usurps the role of the
court, as the court has no basis for determining if the substantive ele-
ments exist to be proved at trial.113
For example, in Wright v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,3' the declara-
tion was held to be insufficient. The plaintiff alleged that "the negligence
of the defendant was willful and wanton." The plaintiff failed to allege
facts which would establish willful and wanton conduct.' The role of the
court was to decide whether the plaintiff established a right to relief
under the substantive law-whether the defendant's conduct was willful
and wanton. The pleadings only alleged the substantive element, willful
and wanton conduct, rather than alleging the facts of the underlying dis-
pute. The role of the court in deciding whether the substantive elements
were established was usurped by the pleading because the court was given
no facts on which it could base its decision. Therefore, the court held that
the declaration was insufficient because the allegation was a conclusion of
law.1
4
130. Id.
131. See Shumaker's Adm'x v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 125 Va. 393, 396-97, 99 S.E.
739, 739-40 (1919). In Shumaker the court stated that it is not necessary to mention in the
declaration the statute under which the plaintiff is suing, but rather the facts which support
the cause of action arising under the statute. Id. at 397, 99 S.E. at 740; see also Southern
Ry. Co. v. Simmons, 105 Va. 651, 654, 55 S.E. 459, 460 (1906) (stating the pleading was
sufficient if it suggested the legal effects of a statute).
In Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Hunter, 109 Va. 341, 64 S.E. 44 (1909), the declaration
stated that the defendant had a "duty... to exercise ordinary care ... and that he failed
to exercise such care." Id. at 342, 64 S.E. at 45. The court held that the declarations merely
stated conclusions of law and not the underlying facts which created the duty. Id. at 343, 64
S.E. at 45.
In City of Richmond v. McCormack, 120 Va. 552, 555, 91 S.E. 767, 768-69 (1917), the
declaration contained facts which established the duty and also the meaning of the term
"duty." The court held that the pleading was sufficient and treated the term duty as mere
surplusage, a defect in form cured by the statute of Jeofails. Id. at 556, 91 S.E. 768-69.
In Lane Bros. Co. v. Seakford, 106 Va. 93, 55 S.E. 556 (1906), the court held the declara-
tion sufficient because it not only stated the bare elements, but it also set out the facts with
sufficient detail so that the court could find the plaintiff entitled to recovery if the facts
were proved. Id. at 95-96, 55 S.E. at 556-57.
132. 110 Va. 670, 66 S.E. 848 (1910).
133. Id. at 676, 66 S.E. at 850.
134. Id. at 677, 66 S.E. at 850. The declaration in a malicious prosecution action was held
to be defective in Craft v. Moloney Belting Co., 117 Va. 480, 85 S.E. 486 (1915). The plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants, by means of evidence they knew was false, caused the plain-
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In contrast, in E.L Du Pont1 35 the plaintiff alleged that the intestate
was invited on the defendant's premises and that the defendant's servant
wrongfully killed the intestate. However, the plaintiff did not use the
word "duty." 136 The role of the court was to determine if the pleadings
established the element of duty. The allegation that the intestate was in-
vited on defendant's premises gave the court a basis for determining
whether the substantive element, duty, was established; the declaration
was sufficient.
1 37
The court discussed the second parameter-ultimate facts rather than
evidentiary facts-in Norfolk & Portsmouth Beltline Railroad v. Stur-
gis. 38 The court reasoned that the allegations were sufficient if they ap-
prised the trial court and the opposing party of the nature of the claim.1 39
Facts which directly establish the substantive elements of the action ap-
prise the court and the opposing party of the claim. These are ultimate
facts.140 Facts which go beyond this are evidentiary facts and need not be
pleaded.
An ultimate fact is a fact in issue and an evidentiary fact is a fact
which proves the existence of ultimate facts.141 This distinction is best
illustrated by considering the function of the factfinder and the function
of the pleading. It is the function of the pleading to state facts which
show a right to judicial remedy. It is the function of the factfinder to
decide whether the facts alleged in the pleading are established by the
evidence. Therefore, only those facts that directly establish the substan-
tive requirements-ultimate facts-must be pleaded. The facts which al-
low the factfinder to determine if the ultimate facts are estab-
lished-evidentiary facts-need not be pleaded.
In Hunter v. Burroughs,'42 the declaration alleged that the defendant
was unskillful and "negligent" as he "did prescribe. . . wholly improper,
inappropriate, and hurtful medicines and so-called remedies, being two
tiff to be convicted. The plaintiff did not allege how the defendants knew the evidence was
false. Id. at 482-83, 85 S.E. at 487. The role of the court was to decide whether the substan-
tive element, knowledge of falsity, was established. Because the allegations did not contain
underlying facts, the court had no basis for determining whether the substantive elements
were established. Therefore, the declaration was defective because it was a mere conclusion
of law. Id.
135. 124 Va. 177, 97 S.E. 812 (1919).
136. Id. at 184-185, 97 S.E. at 814.
137. Id. at 185, 97 S.E. at 814.
138. 117 Va. 532, 85 S.E. 572 (1915).
139. Id. at 539, 85 S.E. at 574-75.
140. See American Hide & Leather Co. v. Chalkley & Co., 101 Va. 458, 44 S.E. 705 (1903)
(the declaration stated facts which established the elements of assumpsit; more than that is
not required because they would be evidentiary facts).
141. Klaff v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 120 Va. 347, 349, 91 S.E. 173, 173 (1917), rev'd on
other grounds, 123 Va. 260, 96 S.E. 244 (1918).
142. 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
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certain salves, which were prescribed by and [were] known to [the de-
fendant]. . . each of which were wholly unsuited to the condition of the
plaintiff's said legs and ankles [and produced] further injuries ... .
The legal issue in Hunter was whether the defendant breached his duty
of care. The fact that the defendant prescribed improper medicine, un-
suited for the treatment of the plaintiff's legs and ankles, established the
substantive element of breach; it was an ultimate fact. The role of the
factfinder was to determine whether the evidence showed that the medi-
cation was improper and was provided by the defendant. Therefore, the
allegation that the medicine "being two certain salves, which were pre-
scribed by and known to the defendant" was an evidentiary fact.
Hunter is a good example of the factual precision parameters. The alle-
gation that the defendant was negligent is a conclusion of law. The fact
that the defendant prescribed improper medicine unsuited for the treat-
ment of the plaintiff is an ultimate fact, and the only fact that need be
pleaded.
b. Analysis of the Trespass on the Case Pleading Rules
An analysis of the pleading rules for trespass on the case actions illus-
trates the changing emphasis of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The cog-
nizable substantive branch was marked by the traditional common law
requirement of alleging a cause of action by stating the elements of the
substantive law.' The unwavering requirement of a statement of ele-
ments demonstrates the court's insistence that the pleading focus the
issues.
The factual precision branch for trespass on the case actions centered
around attaining a statement of facts. The distinctions between conclu-
sions of law, ultimate facts, and evidentiary facts were intended to re-
quire an adequate statement of underlying facts. In addition, the court
required that the ultimate facts be alleged with certainty.145 Further, the
requirements of the factual precision branch enticed pleaders to err on
the side of alleging too many facts. Although the court did not commend
143. Id. at 120-21, 96 S.E. at 362 (emphasis in original).
144. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
145. See Eaton v. Moore, 111 Va. 400, 69 S.E. 326 (1910). In Eaton the declaration stated
that "plaintiff who was then an infant of the age of three years ... got possession of the
[dynamite caps], and in some way, while in possession, and without any fault on the part of
the plaintiff, the said caps were exploded, which [blinded the child]." Id. at 401, 69 S.E. at
326. The court stated that the rules of pleading require that the plaintiff set out the mate-
rial facts of the case to show a complete right of action. The court then held the pleading
insufficient because the "declaration [does] not aver that the plaintiff exploded the caps, nor
[does] it show that they were exploded by an agency from which the defendants were re-
sponsible. In other words, every averment of the declaration may be true, and yet there may
be no liability whatsoever resting on the defendants." Id. at 403, 69 S.E. at 327.
[Vol. 25:135
SPECIFICITY OF PLEADING
allegations of evidentiary facts because they confused the issues, their use
in the pleading was not fatal because they were treated as mere
surplusage.
146
The pleading theory of trespass on the case is similar to the equity
pleading theory. The expandable scope of the trespass on the case action
is similar to the single type of equity proceeding. The success of the eq-
uity pleading rules influenced common law pleading during this period. In
addition, the pleading theory of trespass on the case was similar to the
pleading theory of code jurisdictions, which retained the traditional no-
tion of a cause of action.147 These similarities demonstrate the reform of
the period and the debate in the Virginia bar over the adoption of a sys-
tem similar to the Field Code.
1 41
3. The Rise of the Motion for Judgment
The major method of law reform in Virginia in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was to increase the availability of the motion for
judgment proceeding. 149 The motion for judgment was an informal pro-
ceeding at first, with no right to a jury."' The motion for judgment took
the place of the common law writ and declaration. 5" The motion for
146. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. McCormack, 120 Va. 552, 91 S.E. 767 (1917). In Mc-
Cormack, the declaration contained facts of the circumstances which were sufficient to es-
tablish the element of duty. The declaration also contained the term "duty." The court held
that the pleading was sufficient and treated the term duty as mere surplusage, a defect in
form cured by the statute of Jeofails. Id.; see also Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Bouknight,
113 Va. 696, 75 S.E. 1032 (1912). In Bouknight the declaration alleged that the plaintiff who
was a passenger in the defendants' care was injured when the defendants' car derailed. In
addition, the declaration stated "the said car [was] derailed by reason of the carelessness
and negligence of the said defendant." Id. at 699, 75 S.E. at 1033-34. The court stated that a
presumption of negligence is made in passenger injuries, and thus, the declaration was suffi-
cient and the addition of the averment of carelessness and negligence was mere surplusage.
Id. at 699, 75 S.E. at 1034.
147. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
149. For a thorough discussion of the history of the motion for judgment proceeding in
Virginia, see W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 192-202.
150. Id. at 194.
151. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Schreck, 131 Va. 581, 109 S.E. 595 (1921) (Burks, J.).
"The notice, however, so far as it serves as a substitute for the declaration, must state in
substance a good cause of action, else it will be bad on demurrer, and so far as it serves as a
writ it must fix a time and place for the defendant to make defense ...... Id. at 584-85, 109
S.E. at 596; see also Tench v. Gregg, 102 Va. 215, 46 S.E. 287 (1904); Grubbs v. National
Life Maturity Ins. Co., 94 Va. 589, 27 S.E. 464, 466 (1897).
The following is an example of a motion for judgment:
To Mr. J. R. Pirkey.
You will please take notice that *** I will move the circuit court *** for judg-
ment against you for the sum of twenty-seven hundred dollars ($2,700.00), with legal
interest thereon from September 14, 1917, until paid, the same being due me from
you by virtue of the following account, which said account is sworn to and filed as
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judgment instructed the defendant to appear, and it presented the allega-
tions depicting the dispute.
The motion for judgment was created in 1705 to allow public officials to
recover fees collected by sheriffs.'52 In 1748, the motion for judgment be-
came available to private parties for suits on forthcoming bonds. 153 The
availability continued to expand to a variety of specific actions.'5
The legislature slowly sanctioned the use of the motion for judgment as
an alternative to the general common law actions. In 1849, all actions for
money judgments on contracts could be prosecuted by motion for judg-
ment. 55 In 1912, any action sounding in tort could be prosecuted by mo-
tion for judgment.5 " The motion for judgment became an alternative to
all common law actions in 1919,157 and quickly supplanted the traditional
common law procedures because of its simplicity.'
a. Cognizable Substantive Branch Under the Motion for Judgment
Although the motion for judgment was analogous to the complaint
under the Field Code, because all substantive actions were prosecuted
under the same procedures, Virginia did not abandon the substantive un-
derpinnings of the common law. The complaint under the Field Code
took the place of the common law declaration, as did the motion for judg-
ment. Under both the Field Code and the motion for judgment, the alle-
gations had to establish a "cause of action.' 59
part of this notice:
J.R. Pirkey in Account with W.A. Rinehart.
September 14, 1917. To amount advanced to the Covington Savings Bank, Incorpo-
rated, for your benefit to repair and replenish your forty (40) shares of stock on the
Covington Savings Bank, Inc., on which you have drawn dividends on two occasions
since your said stock being so repaired and replenished, and which said sum of $2,700
so advanced by me to repair you said stock you have impliedly promised to pay me
and which said advancement of $2,700 on my part to repair you said stock was subse-
quently ratified by you, thus making you liable to me for $2,700 with legal interest
thereon from September 14th, 1917, till paid."
[Signed] W. A. Rinehart, by Counsel.
Schreck, 131 Va. at 581, 109 S.E. at 595.
152. See W. BRYSON supra note 15, at 192-93.
153. Id. at 194.
154. Id. at 195-96.
155. Id. at 196.
156. Id. at 198.
157. Id. at 199.
158. Id. at 200-01. See Arnold, Simonton & Havighurst, Report to the Committee on Ju-
dicial Administration and Legal Reform of the West Virginia Bar Association Concerning
Suggestions Pleading and Practice in West Virginia, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 67-68 (1929) (stat-
ing that the simplicity of the motion resulted in its use in 90% of cases where it could be
employed).
159. Compare 1851 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 479, § 1 with Mathews v. LaPrade, 130 Va. 408, 107
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Many code jurisdictions, and the federal rules, adopted the view that
the requirements for establishing a cause of action are the same for all
actions regardless of the substantive right or requested remedy. For ex-
ample, in Brewer v. Temple,160 a New York court held that a complaint
setting forth the history of one occurrence was a single cause of action
even though the plaintiff sought redress for both an assault and slander.
In this case the cognizable substantive branch required a statement of a
set of facts, an occurrence, which showed the plaintiff had been wronged.
Virginia rejected this view and retained the traditional concept of the
substantive elements of a particular form of action establishing a cause of
action. In Bowles v. May,'' the court held that the motion for judgment
was defective because it contained elements of assault and slander com-
bined in a single recital of events. The court said that assault and slander
were two separate causes of action and must be alleged with certainty so
that the defendant could ascertain the true basis of the plaintiff's
claims. 2 Under the Virginia view, therefore, allegations must establish
the substantive elements of each particular form of action.' 6 '
The Virginia Supreme Court has been unwavering in its rejection of the
view enunciated in Brewer.6 4 The court addressed the need to retain the
substantive common law principles in Carter v. Hinkle,'6 5 stating:
Shortcuts and improvisations may be appealing, but if certainty and pre-
dictability, qualities so necessary in the law, are to be maintained, the logi-
cal and symmetrical distinction of the common law carefully developed
through the necessities of experience, should be preserved and not de-
stroyed .... [R]ights are too important and liability too oppressive to be
determined and administered in wholesale fashion.66
Moreover, Virginia's view results from the fact that the motion for
judgment procedures were an alternative to the common law system. The
S.E. 795 (1921).
160. 15 How. Pr. 286 (1857).
161. 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932).
162. Id. at 422-23, 166 S.E. at 551.
163. The requirement that an allegation establish the substantive common law elements
is illustrated in Mathews, 130 Va. at 408, 107 S.E. at 795. In Mathews, the plaintiff sought
damages for breach of an option contract. The court held that a substantive element of the
action was the exercise of the option. Id. at 413, 107 S.E. at 796-97. As the plaintiff did not
allege in the motion that the option was exercised, the motion failed to state a cause of
action; the demurrer was properly sustained. Id.
164. Foltz v. Conrad Realty Co., 131 Va. 496, 501, 109 S.E. 463, 465 (1921); Virginia Hot
Springs Co. v. Schreck, 131 Va. 581, 584-85, 109 S.E. 595, 596 (1921); Mathews v. LaPrade,
130 Va. 408, 107 S.E. 795 (1921); Mankin v. Aldridge, 127 Va. 761, 105 S.E. 459 (1920);
Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Fields, 110 Va. 827, 830, 67 S.E. 342, 343 (1910).
165. 189 Va. 1, 52 S.E.2d 135 (1949).
166. Id. at 7-8, 52 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61
N.E.2d 707, 718 (1945)).
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legislature intended the scope of the motion for judgment procedures to
cover remedies which were available through the common law actions.1s
The motion for judgment derived its structure from the substantive ele-
ments required to be established in order to show a right to judicial relief.
b. Factual Precision Branch Under the Motion for Judgment
The purpose of the motion for judgment was to provide a simpler and
less expensive procedure than the common law process."' 8 Thus, the court
viewed a pleading's factual precision with leniency and was careful not to
destroy the effectiveness of the motion for judgment by imposing needless
restrictions. 169 In early motion for judgment cases, the court created a
legal fiction that the parties, rather than a person versed in the law, had
drafted the motion.170 However, the fiction failed to establish a standard
which could be used as guidance, and the court later rejected it.'
Judge Burks, clarifying the standard for a motion for judgment, enunci-
ated the necessary factual precision for the motion by stating:
[P]rocedure by motion is looked upon with great indulgence, and notices are
upheld as sufficient, however informal, where they contain sufficient sub-
stance to fairly apprise the defendant of the nature of the demand ... and
states sufficient facts to enable the court to say that if the facts stated are
proved, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.1
Therefore, to have the required factual precision, a motion for judgment
had to state facts that fairly apprised the opposing party of the true na-
ture of the claim by stating a cause of action.'1i
167. See M. BuRKs, supra note 67, § 180, at 290.
168. Witley v. Brooker Brick Co., 113 Va. 434, 436, 74 S.E. 160, 161 (1912).
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Board of Supervisors v. Dunn, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 608, 612 (1876).
171. Judge Burks rejected this legal fiction in Mankin v. Aldridge, 127 Va. 761, 767, 105
S.E. 459, 461 (1920). In Mankin, Judge Burks stated:
The procedure by notice ... is looked upon with great indulgence, not because the
notice is supposed to be the act of a layman ignorant of forms of procedure, for that
would be contrary to almost universal experience, but because the courts are loath to
sacrifice substance to form, and desire, so far as possible to avoid that result. The
adoption of this method of procedure however, cannot dispense with the allegation of
the substance of a good ground of action or defense. Anything less than this would
endanger the substantial rights of litigants.
Id. at 767, 105 S.E. at 461.
172. Id. at 765, 105 S.E. at 460 (emphasis added).
173. See id.; see also Curtis v. Peebles, 161 Va. 780, 783-84, 172 S.E. 257, 258 (1934);
Foltz v. Conrad Realty Co., 131 Va. 496, 501, 109 S.E. 463, 465 (1921); Virginia Hot Springs
Co. v. Schreck, 131 Va. 581, 584-85, 109 S.E. 595, 596 (1921); Colley v. Summers Parrot
Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S.E. 906 (1916). In Colley, the defendants demurred because
the motion merely stated that the paper sued on was a promissory note but did not allege it
to be negotiable. The court held that incompleteness of the allegation was not enough to
sustain the demurrer because it "in no way affected the defendant to his prejudice." Id.
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Under the factual. precision branch, it is difficult to distinguish the test
for a trespass on the case from the test for a motion for judgment. Both
tests require the pleading to allege a statement of facts, but the distin-
guishing characteristic is the elasticity of the definition of a sufficient
statement of facts.
As shown, the trespass on the case test applied mechanical rules to de-
termine whether the allegation was an ultimate fact, and therefore, a suf-
ficient statement of fact.17 4 In contrast, the motion for judgment test gave
the court greater discretion in determining whether an allegation was a
sufficient statement of fact. As long as the motion for judgment informed
the opposing party of the claim's underlying factual basis, the allegation
was sufficient, even though it may have violated the mechanical definition
of an ultimate fact.
By creating a case specific test, rather than a universal application of
mechanical rules, the court balanced the need to elevate substance over
form with the need of the parties to have notice of the specific facts
which gave rise to the cause of action. Once again, Virginia engrafted a
well-reasoned modification of existing pleading rules, rather than a whole-
sale abandonment of valuable past experience.
c. Analysis of Pleading Rules of the Motion for Judgment
The pleading theory which evolved in Virginia under the motion for
judgment was unique. The cognizable substantive branch required a
statement of elements establishing a cause of action. The unwavering in-
sistence on the statement of substantive elements was a result of the view
that the pleading must focus the issues.175 Therefore, the cognizable sub-
stantive branch is similar to the traditional common law pleading theory.
The factual precision branch of the motion for judgment illustrates a
subtle change from the trespass on the case pleading theory. The court
shifted its emphasis from the mechanical pleading rules of trespass on the
case and focused upon the opposing party's knowledge of the cause of
action. In so doing, the court moved closer along the continuum toward
the notice pleading theory of the federal rules.
Nevertheless, the factual precision branch of the motion for judgment
remained distinguishable from the federal notice pleading theory in two
respects. First, a motion for judgment, unlike a federal complaint, must
allege facts that establish all the elements of a cause of action.117 There-
fore, the motion for judgment necessarily requires more facts to be al-
174. See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
175. See id.
176. Compare supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text with supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
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leged. Second, the motion for judgment, unlike the federal complaint,
must allege the underlying facts rather than bare conclusions. 177 Thus,
the factual precision standard of the motion for judgment is more partic-
ular than the liberal standard of the federal rules.
IV. SPECIFICITY IN MODERN VIRGINIA PRACTICE
A. A Historical Perspective
Unlike the early Virginia pleading rules, which were created by
case law, the standards regulating modern pleading are codified.
The older case precedent, however, is the basis for the Virginia
rules of court and the demurrer statute. This section will present
a historical perspective of the pleading standards, analyze the
court's use of the standards, and provide the modern specificity
requirement.
1. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
Law reform in the early twentieth century culminated in the
adoption of procedural rules by the Virginia Supreme Court.17 8
The rules retain the distinction between common law and equity,
and prescribe different procedures for each. The only marked
change in the pleading practice of actions at law was the abolition
of the common law procedural writs and the declaration system of
the forms of action. Rule 3:1 provided that the rules applied to all
actions at law.179 Rule 3:3 provided that the filing of a motion for
177. In a federal complaint in Samsing v. S. & P. Co., 325 F.2d 718, 718 (9th Cir. 1963),
the plaintiff alleged that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The court held that
the plaintiff need not set out the facts which were the basis of the claim, and the conclusion
of the plaintiff provided sufficient notice. Id. For cases where the Supreme Court of Virginia
found pleadings based on conclusions of law, see supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
178. See Report of Committee to Study the Necessity for Revision of Procedure in Vir-
ginia (June 15, 1940) (briefly outlining, inter alia, the status of Virginia law, the attitudes of
the bar toward a revision of Virginia law, and the recommendations for vesting the rulemak-
ing power in the Supreme Court of Virginia) (this source can be obtained at the Virginia
State Library); Boyd, Virginia Procedural Legislation of 1954, 40 VA. L. REv. 1097, 1097-98
(1954) (stating that a significant change in Virginia's procedural system was accomplished
when the supreme court adopted the Rules of Court effective February 1, 1950).
The supreme court was first given the power to prescribe rules of procedure in 1849. See
Bowles, The Course of Law Reform in Virginia, 38 VA. L. REv. 689, 690 (1952). The power
was not exercised until the Judicial Council headed by Chief Justice Hudgins adopted a
system of procedure on February 1, 1950. The new system adapted many of the existing
procedures for modem practice and added new procedures as required. The traditional
method of law reform in Virginia is a slow and careful process. This style of law reform
dates back to the works of Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton, George Wythe, Thomas
Ludwell Lee and George Mason. Id.
179. See M. BURKS, supra note 67, § 180, at 290.
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judgment commenced an action, thereby foreclosing the option of
bringing an action under the common law writ system. Therefore,
a single procedural form of action exists in Virginia.
In 1950, the specificity required in a motion for judgment was
contained in Rule 3:18(d) which provided that "[e]very pleading
shall state the facts on which the party relies . . . and it shall be
sufficient if it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature
of the claim or defense."180 In addition, Rule 2:20 contained the
specificity required for a bill of complaint in equity; it stated that
"[i]n any pleading a simple statement, in numbered paragraphs, of
the essential facts is sufficient.'' 1
In 1972, the Rules were amended to their present state. The
standard for actions at law, formerly Rule 3:18(d), was moved to
Rule 1:4(d). The standard for equity actions, formerly Rule 2:20,
was moved to Rule 1:4(j). Both standards, therefore, now apply to
law and equity actions. According to the language of the Rules, the
pleadings are sufficient in both common law and equity actions, if
they state "the essential facts" that "clearly inform[] the opposite
party of the true nature of the claim or defense."'8s It should be
noted that in determining the specificity standard, the Rules of
Court must be read in connection with the demurrer statute.
In addition, the rules contain guidance for particular actions.
Rule 3:16(b) allows general allegations in negligence and contribu-
tory negligence cases, and Rule 3:16(e) permits general allegations
of the statute of limitation defense.
2. The Demurrer Statute
In Virginia, the sufficiency of a pleading is tested by demurrer.'8 3 A
demurrer admits the truth of all facts which are well pleaded and facts
which may be reasonably inferred from the facts alleged.' 84 If the facts
admitted establish a cause of action, the pleading is sufficient.'8 5
In 1977, the General Assembly revised title eight of the Code of Vir-
ginia. The demurrer statute was amended to provide: "In any suit in eq-
uity or action at law, the contention that a pleading does not state a cause
180. VA. CT. R 3:18(d) (amended 1:4(d)).
181. Id. at 2:20 (amended 1:4(j)).
182. Id. at 1:4(d).
183. See W. BRYsoN, supra note 15, at 226-27.
184. Ames v. American Nat'l Bank, 163 Va. 1, 37, 176 S.E. 204, 215 (1934). Well pleaded
facts are ultimate facts.
185. Id.
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of action or that such pleading fails to state facts upon which the relief
demanded can be granted may be made by demurrer." ' The modern
demurrer is the mechanism for determining whether the pleading meets
the required standard.
B. Analysis of Modern Pleading Practice
1. Cognizable Substantive Branch of Modern Practice
The requirements of the cognizable substantive branch in modern Vir-
ginia practice are similar in both equity and common law actions. Virginia
firmly retains the requirement that the substantive elements of the ac-
tions be established by the allegations. Although the forms of action were
"buried" by Virginia in the 1950 Rules, "they still rule us from their
graves."181
7
Unfortunately, the language of the 1950 Rule 3:18(d),"'s now 1:4(d), was
similar to the standard in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 9 The
federal practice test is whether the opposing party can obtain an under-
standing of the claim,' ° whereas a Virginia pleading is tested by whether
the stated facts inform the opposite party of the nature of the claim. The
similarity in the language of the rules produced a misconception that Vir-
ginia is a "notice" pleading jurisdiction. 19'
This misconception arose from a failure to properly comprehend the
historical development of pleading practice in Virginia. Although the lan-
guage of Rule 3:18(d) did not explicitly require a statement of a "cause of
action" it evolved from case precedent addressing motion for judgment
proceedings." 2 Since the rule is a codification of the specificity rules
under the prior motion for judgment, the requirement that the elements
of the substantive action be pleaded remains the standard under the cog-
nizable substantive branch of the rule.' 93 It is submitted that the term
"cause of action" was left out of the rule to avoid the problems that other
jurisdictions had with the term.19 4
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-273 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
187. See W. BRYSON, supra note 15, at 204 (quoting F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTON
AT COMMON LAW 2 (1965)); see also Wilson, Writs v. Rights: An Unended Contest, 18 MICH.
L. REv. 255 (1920).
188. VA. CT. R. 3:18(d) (amended 1:4(d)).
189. Compare VA. CT. R. 3:18(d) with FED. R. Cmv. P. 8(a)(2).
190. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
191. See Greer, Virginia and the Federal Rules, 47 VA. L. REv. 906 (1961). Greer states
that the "notice pleading is part and parcel of the Virginia rules .... There could be no
better description [than rule 3:18(d), now 1:4(d}] of notice pleading." Id. at 909.
192. See M. BURKS, supra note 67, § 182, at 295.
193. Id.
194. For a discussion of the problem in determining a cause of action, see supra notes 39-
47 and accompanying text.
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The Virginia Supreme Court, in interpreting Rule 3:18, stated that "[i]t
is not even debatable that under. . .Rule 3:18. . .material facts consti-
tuting a cause of action shall be stated."'19 5 Further, the Virginia Supreme
Court's 1987 decision in Fox v. Deese,'9 8 illustrates the court's continued
insistence that the allegations establish the elements of the substantive
form of action. In Fox, the plaintiff sought damages for tortious interfer-
ence with a contract.197 In testing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allega-
tions, the court stated that one element of the action was that the inter-
ference induced or caused the breach of the contract. 98 The plaintiff
failed to plead facts which would establish that the interference caused
the breach. Therefore, the court held that the pleading was defective.' 99
In contrast, the cognizable substantive branch in federal practice is
demonstrated in Dioguardi v. Durning.°0° In Dioguardi, Judge Clark held
that a "home drawn" complaint was sufficient. The plaintiff alleged that
his goods were auctioned by the defendant, but that some of the goods
disappeared three weeks before the auction.20 ' Judge Clark held that the
federal rules did not require the allegations of fact to establish each ele-
ment of the cause of action. Because the allegations informed the defend-
ant that the plaintiff was claiming his goods were converted, the pleading
was sufficient. Dioguardi shows that the cognizable substantive branch of
the federal rules requires only that the allegations establish that the
plaintiff has suffered an actionable wrong, without regard to the substan-
tive elements of the claim.
20 2
The 1972 amendments to the Virginia rules demonstrate a continued
commitment to the requirement that pleadings establish the elements of
a particular claim. The equity requirement of stating "essential facts"
was made applicable to actions at law. 20 3 The essential facts are the alle-
gations which show the party is entitled to relief under the substantive
law. 04 For example, in Pair v. Rook,'20 5 the complainant sought specific
performance of a contract. Entitlement to specific performance requires
that the terms of the contract be certain and definite. 20 6 The court held
that because the complaint did not allege definite terms of the contract,
195. Manassas Park Dev. Co. v. Offutt, 203 Va. 382, 384, 124 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1962) (empha-
sis added).
196. 234 Va. 412, 362 S.E.2d 699 (1987).
197. Id. at 420, 362 S.E.2d" at 703.
198. Id. at 429, 362 S.E. at 709.
199. Id.
200. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
203. VA. CT. R. 1:4(j).
204. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
205. 195 Va. 196, 77 S.E.2d 395 (1953).
206. Id. at 204, 77 S.E.2d at 400.
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the pleading was defective. 20 7
Finally, any doubt concerning the application of the cognizable sub-
stantive branch in Virginia was put to rest by the amendment of the de-
murrer statute in 1977.28 The statute provides that failing to state a
cause of action and failing to state facts upon which relief can be granted
are grounds for demurrer.20 9 The demurrer statute was a codification of
existing practice. 210 Thus, it is clear that the allegations must establish
elements of the substantive cause of action.
The cognizable substantive branch in Virginia practice originates from
the traditional common law pleading requirements. Virginia has retained
the proven common law substantive classifications as the structure for the
pleading. Accordingly, the role of the pleading-focusing the issues-has
been preserved.
2. Factual Precision Branch of Modern Virginia Practice: A Product of
Reasoned Evolution
The required factual precision in modern Virginia practice is deter-
mined by two parameters. The first parameter is the requirement that the
allegations be statements of fact, rather than conclusions of law.2 1' This
requirement is derived from the demurrer statute, Rule 1:4(d), and Rule
1:4(j), each of which requires a statement of fact. This principle was ex-
plained in Phipps v. Sutherland,2 12 where the court stated:
[I]t is improper to allege legal conclusions instead of facts from which such
conclusions are drawn. For example, if defendant is sought to be charged as
trustee for the plaintiff, the circumstances giving rise to the trust must be
alleged; so, if the purpose of the bill is to have a deed set aside for fraud of
207. Id. at 209, 77 S.E.2d 402.
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-273 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
209. Id.
210. See VIRGINIA CODE COMMISSION, REVISION OF TITLE 8 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA,
HOUSE Doc. No. 14 at 186 (1977).
211. See Koch v. Seventh Street Realty Corp., 205 Va. 65, 135 S.E.2d 131 (1964). In Koch
the allegations in the plaintiff's bill stated that "by fraud, deceit and other devices" the
defendants concealed from the stockholders "their real function, contrary to the interest of
said corporation." Id. at 71, 135 S.E.2d at 135. The court held that the statements were
conclusions of law, and thus, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. Id.; see also, e.g.,
Abbott v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 820, 108 S.E.2d 243 (1959).
In Arlington Yellow Cab Co. v. Transportation Inc., 207 Va. 313, 149 S.E.2d 877 (1966),
the plaintiff's declaration stated that a taxi certification was illegally issued. The plaintiff
alleged that the county manager "was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in that there
was insufficient evidence" to support the county managers finding that the taxi service was
needed. Id. at 318, 149 S.E.2d at 881. The court held that these allegations were conclusions
of law because they failed to state facts indicating the specific information that was before
the county manager when he make his decision. Id.
212. 201 Va. 448, 111 S.E.2d 422 (1959).
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the defendant, or because the contract was tainted with usury or illegality, a
mere allegation that the transaction was fraudulent, or usurious, or illegal,
without the facts constituting the fraud, or usury, or illegality, would be
insufficient.213
The second parameter is more difficult to ascertain because it is not
expressly addressed in the modern cases. The second parameter is dis-
cerned from analyzing the historical development of the pleading rules in
Virginia in light of the demurrer.
In both common law and equity actions, the demurrer admits the facts
which are well pleaded.214 Under the demurrer test, "reasonable infer-
ences of fact which a trier of fact may fairly and justly draw from the
facts alleged" are also admitted.
2 1 5
Rule 1:4(d) and the demurrer test can be read consistently, and
through such an interpretation, the second parameter is discerned. The
rule requires that the facts inform the opposite party.1 " If the fact di-
rectly establishes the element, it is a fact well pleaded, or in historical
vernacular an ultimate fact, and thereby, the party is informed. 21 7 Alter-
natively, if the factfinder, as a matter of law, can reasonably infer the
element, then the opposite party is informed. An examination of the
court's decisions reveals that the degree of inference is narrow. The nar-
row degree of inference is a product of the court's strict treatment of
modern pleadings, as demonstrated in Harrell v. Woodson,218 where the
213. Id. at 456-66, 111 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting W. LILE & E. MEADE, EQurrY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 75 (3d ed. 1952)).
214. See, e.g., Grossmann v. Saunders, 237 Va. 113, 119, 376 S.E.2d 66, 69 (1989) (law
case); Chippenham Manor, Inc. v. Dervishian, 214 Va. 448, 450, 201 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1974)
(equity case).
215. Ames v. American Nat'l Bank, 163 Va. 1, 176 S.E. 204 (1934). Ames is a landmark
demurrer case. The court draws an important distinction between the inferences which may
be considered in a ruling on a demurrer. Id. at 37-38, 176 S.E. at 215-16. The court stated
that "all reasonable inferences ... which a trier of fact may fairly and justly draw from the
facts alleged must be considered by the court in aid of the pleading." Id. at 37-38, 176 S.E.
at 216. However, the demurrer does not permit inferences of fact drawn by the pleader from
the facts alleged. Id. at 37, 176 S.E.2d at 216. In Ames, the court construed a contract which
was incorporated in the pleading. The court determined that it was improper to use infer-
ences of fact drawn by the pleader in deciding the sufficiency of a contract because this
would "put a construction on the words the parties have used which they do not properly
bear." Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, only the reasonable inferences of the trier of fact,
not a party-pleader, could be used in determining the sufficiency of the pleading. See also
e.g., Hoffman v. First Nat'l Bank, 205 Va. 232, 135 S.E.2d 818 (1964); Kellam v. School
Board, 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960); Fleenor v. Dorton, 187 Va. 659, 47 S.E.2d 329
(1948). It should be noted that the rule in Ames applies in both equity and law cases and
that the rule applies when the court is passing on validity of an amended pleading. See
Ryland Group, Inc. v. Wills, 229 Va. 459, 461, 331 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1985).
216. VA. CT. R. 1:4(d).
217. For a discussion of ultimate facts, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
218. 233 Va. 117, 353 S.E.2d 770 (1987).
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court stated:
The less formal system established by the present rules offers greatly en-
hanced opportunities for the discovery of an opponent's evidence, but much
less opportunity to pin down the legal theories underlying his claim. It is
therefore even more important under the present system to insure that each
party be fairly informed of the true nature of the claim or defense. 21 9
Three modern cases demonstrate the narrow degree of inference per-
mitted by the court. First, in Ely v. Whitlock,220 in an attempt to estab-
lish that the defendant acted with specific intent to cause the plaintiff
severe emotional injury, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant acted
"with intent to injure plaintiff's health. '22' The court held that the allega-
tion was not sufficient because the trier of fact could not reasonably infer
the element from the allegation.222
Second, in Rosillo v. Winters,'22 an action for dissolution of a partner-
ship, the plaintiff attempted to establish the element that "the 'business
of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss.' ",224 To this end, the
plaintiff alleged that the partnership had sustained substantial losses for
several years and that "the partnership was in immediate danger of losing
its assets.'225 The court held that the allegations were "barely" sufficient
to establish the element.226
Third, in Burns v. Board of Supervisors,227 an eminent domain action,
the allegations stated that private property had been dedicated to the
Board of Supervisors. The court determined that since the Board of Su-
pervisors was a public body, it was a reasonable inference that the prop-
erty was to be used for a public purpose.
228
The court does not inquire about whether the party is on notice.
Rather, the court selects allegations, without respect to their meaning
within the context of the entire pleading, and determines if they establish
the element. This method is similar to the method that was used in code
pleading jurisdictions. This distinguishes the federal "notice" standard
from the standard of specificity required in Virginia.
219. Id. at 121, 353 S.E.2d at 773.
220. 238 Va. 670, 385 S.E.2d 893 (1989).
221. Id. at 677, 385 S.E.2d at 898.
222. See id.
223. 235 Va. 268, 367 S.E.2d 717 (1988).
224. Id. at 270, 367 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 50-32(1)(e) (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 218 Va. 625, 238 S.E.2d 823 (1977).
228. Id. at 628, 238 S.E.2d at 825.
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V. GUIDANCE FOR MODERN PRACTICE
The proper framework for determining the sufficiency of the allegations
in modern Virginia practice requires two primary steps. First, the allega-
tions must comply with the modern cognizable substantive branch; the
allegations must establish the substantive elements of the particular the-
ory of liability.229 All Virginia case authority is instructive because of Vir-
ginia's unwavering insistence on the establishment of a cause of action.
The second step in determining the sufficiency of the pleading is to
ensure that the allegations comply with the factual precision branch. As
shown, the allegations must fall within two parameters. First, the allega-
tions must be statements of fact, rather than conclusions of law. Prece-
dent from trespass on the case actions, pre-1950 motion for judgment
cases, and the modern cases are instructive because they all require a
statement of fact.
Second, the allegation must be either an ultimate fact, which is a fact
well pleaded under the court's demurrer test, or a fact which may be rea-
sonably inferred from the allegation. Trespass on the case and equity pre-
cedent offer the clearest guidance for determining what constitutes an ul-
timate fact.2 30 A pleader should strive to state ultimate facts, otherwise,
he must rely on the narrow degree of inference which the court finds per-
missible. If the pleader is unable to determine whether the allegation is
an ultimate fact, he must be cautious to limit the number of links in the
chain of inference.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modern system of pleading in Virginia has evolved through a pro-
cess of well-reasoned refinements. The current system, properly used and
enforced, focuses the issues, narrows the evidence admissible at trial, ap-
prises the adverse party and the court of the matter in dispute, and pro-
vides the extent of the res judicata effect of the judgment. However, in
order for the pleading system to be effective it must be clearly understood
and enforced through demurrers and amendments. The Virginia pleading
rules are "founded in strong sense, and in the soundest and closest logic"
however through "being misunderstood, and misapplied, they are often
made use of as instruments of chicane. 23'
Ian James Wilson
William Louis Payne
229. See supra notes 189-212 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 140-65 and accompanying text.
231. See B. SHIPMAN, supra note 1 (quoting Lord Mansfield).
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